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Abstract
The European Union (EU) started of as a small trading block and evolved into one big 
region approaching 500 million people. It is planned around the core of Europe that is 
concentrated between London, Paris, Milan, Munich and Hamburg and builds on its 
global economic competitiveness 
Most African states that were colonised in the nineteenth century became independent 
between 1957 and 1964. However they are still dependent for capital, imports and finance 
on the old colonial powers. In most the standard of living as well as its share in world 
economy decreased in the last forty years. The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was 
created in 1963 but largely focussed on political matters. To improve the economic sit 
uation and to implement a vision of Africa’s renewal, the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) was formed with the African Union (AU) to govern this process.
On the surface the European Union and NEPAD might look alike in terms of their objectives 
and principles. However significant differences in handling the effects of globalisation, 
fragmentation, governance as well as planning constraints will force Africa to develop 
its own model for development.
DIE EUROPESE UNIE IS NIE ‘N ROL MODEL VIR NEPAD IN AFRIKA NIE
Die Europese Unie (EU) wat as ’n klein handelsblok begin het, het ontwikkel tot ’n groot 
streek wat 500 miljoen mense benader. Dit is beplan rondom die sentrum van Europa 
wat tussen Londen, Parys, Milaan, München en Hamburg gekonsentreer is en bou op 
hul globale ekonomiese mededingendheid.
Die meeste Afrika state is in die negentiende eeu gekolonialiseer en het tussen 1957 en 
1964 onafhanklik geword. Tog is hul steeds afhanklik van kapitaal, invoere en finansies 
van die ou koloniale magte. In die meeste van hierdie lande het die lewenstandaard 
sowel as hul aandeel in die wêreldekonomie die laaste veertig jaar afgeneem. Die 
Organisasie vir Afrika Unie (OAU) is in 1963 geskep om die ekonomiese situasie te be 
vorder, maar hul fokus was grootliks op politiese sake. Om weereens die visie van Afrika 
se hernuwing te implementeer is die Nuwe Vennootskap vir Afrika se Ontwikkeling 
(“New Partnership for Africa’s Development”  NEPAD) gevorm met die Afrika Unie (AU) 
as “bestuurder” van die proses.
Op die oppervlak mag die Europese Unie en NEPAD dieselfde lyk in terme van hulle doel 
witte en beginsels. Bestaande beduidende verskille in die hantering van globalisasie, 
fragmentering, regering, asook die beplanning beperkings sal Afrika dwing om sy eie 
model te ontwikkel.
1. INTRODUCTION
Both town and regional planningoriginated in a reformist andutopian tradition but their re
spective development followed differ
ent routes (Klosterman, 1978: 37). Town
planning started out as a design
orientated profession, but evolved into
a more scientific discipline, on the basis
of the idea of the rational compre
hensive model. However, it soon be
came apparent that science is not
value free, and neither is planning.
Regional planning, according to
Weaver (1984), accepted right from
the beginning that different world views
influence the world in which planning
operates. 
In the previous century, both capitalism
and socialism advanced as the best
vehicle for reforming the world ac
cording to the utopian ideal. The great
socialist experiment in Russia failed to
deliver utopia; and now the world is
left with only one significant paradigm,
namely capitalism, to deliver the
goods.
Just as Silicon Valley is the role model
for innovation with a view to creating
jobs (Castells & Hall, 1994), the
European Union has become the eco
nomic model for a group of smaller
countries to become bigger role play
ers in world markets. This paper will deal
with the European role model that is
being followed for the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
However, this adherence to the
European model is based on a mis
guided assumption. The motivating
force in this regard is the search for an
ethnic identity and a “place in the sun”
for different cultural groups. The prac
tical issues impending the achievement
of the so called unity that is being
pursued in this way will be investigated.
These issues include the lack of infra
structure, bad governance and ideo
logical differences.
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In The Wizard of OZ, Dorothy and all the
other people who wore green spec
tacles in the Emerald City saw that
everything in the city was green.
Similarly, each person has a meta
phorical pair of glasses which filters the
world around us, separating it into that
which we can and that which we can
not understand (Rapoport, 1977: 38). 
2. SOME OF THE FORCES AT
WORK IN GLOBALISATION
In this global world, there are two major
conflicting ideologies defining attitudes
toward regionalism, namely globalisa
tion and localisation. The former UN
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros
Ghali, stated:
“Today we are living in the midst
of a worldwide revolution. The
planet is in the grip of two vast
opposing forces: globalisation
and fragmentation” (Martin &
Schuman, 1997: 28).
These two forces are driven by different
value systems. The first is most likely
driven by the objective of maximising
profits, while the latter is probably driv
en by the love of what is familiar and
personal or could be a reaction to the
former for the sake of self preservation.
The first force, globalisation, is in favour
of increases in scale, whether in eco
nomic or regional terms. The latter
force, fragmentation, aims to protect
the local. In the world of political sci
ence, the English language does not
distinguish clearly between the Afri
kaans concepts, ‘volk’ and ‘nasie’.
English uses the same word, ‘nation’,
for both terms. The former refers to an
ethnic grouping, while the latter de
notes a governmental territory that
means all the population groups in a
country as a whole. An Afrikaner is a
member of a certain ‘volk’, but is also
part of the South African nation. The
term ‘volk’ correlates with the Oxford
Concise Dictionary’s definition for the
word ‘nation’, namely a community
of people of mainly common descent
and a common history, language, etc.,
forming a state or inhabiting a territory.
The term ‘nasie’ refers to the total
population in a territory or a state,
jointly comprising an empire or a
colony. In the German and Dutch lan
guages, this distinction is understood.
To a certain extent, it correlates with
Tonne’s distinction at local level be
tween the ‘gemeinshaft und gesell
schaft’ community (Johnson, 1981: 164).
Part of the new world order is the cre
ation of bigger regions, such as the
European Union and NEPAD. On the
other hand, fragmentation, along with
the search for a national identity in
Britain had led to the formation of the
Scottish Parliament and the National
Assembly of Wales (Allmendinger, 2001;
Harris & Thomas, 2001). In Eastern
Europe it led to the division of the old
USSR into thirteen new states, as well
as the breaking up of the old Yugo
slavia into different ethnic states, either
in terms of ethnic or religious division.
Although modern man professes not
to discriminate on the grounds of race,
culture or religion, people are still
divided by these differences in prac
tice, as Kipling pointed out in his poem,
The stranger in our midst, in which he
shows that it is those unknown nuances
of ‘being different’ easily lead to con
tempt, distrust and eventually antagon
ism. In a situation where everything was
going well in an economy, and every
body had a job, the ‘melting pot of
philosophy’ of America could work in
practice, in a consumer driven mate
rialistic society.
Peace has been one of the driving
forces behind most wars. No wonder,
then, that the First World War was once
known as the Great War to End All
Wars. But the peace negotiations after
World War I ultimately led to the
Second World War. Even today, the
unequal distribution of goods and
services between people leads to
envy and – ultimately – to hatred.
The change from Russian communism
to global capitalism resulted from the
influence of two contradictory trends
in the evolution of international trade,
namely the growing liberation of trade,
on the one hand and the develop
ment of a variety of projects by the
governments of several countries in
order to set up a trading block, on the
other hand (Castells, 2000: 68).
One of the most important of these
trading blocks is the European Union
(EU). Others include the North
American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), MERCOSUR (formed by Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, in
close collaboration with Bolivia and
Chile), the Asian Pacific Economic
Council (APEC) and, since 2002, the
New Partnership for African Develop
ment (NEPAD). This study will only focus
on the European Union and NEPAD. 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The search for world peace was the
motivation behind the formation of
the League of Nations, after the “Great
War to End All Wars” (1914 1919). How
ever, the League of Nations did not
succeed in creating this peace. In
1943, Jean Monnet, a member of the
Free French government in exile in
Algiers, declared: 
“There will be no peace in
Europe, if the states are recon
stituted on the basis of national
sovereignty … The countries of
Europe are too small to guaran
tee their peoples the necessary
prosperity and social develop
ment. The European states must
constitute themselves into a
federation …” (History of the
European Union, 2005: online).
On a larger scale, the United Nations
was formed after World War Two. In
stead of establishing world peace, this
organisation merely created a platform
for discussion but it failed to bridge the
development gap between the rich
north and the poor south.
On the economic front Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg founded
the BENELUX in 1949. Its purpose was
that of a custom union to facilitate a
free flow of goods and capital
between these states (Zonneveld &
D’hondt, 1994: 34). Subsequently, in
1950, the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Robert Schuman, put forward
Monnet’s plan to place the produc
tion of the raw materials of war (coal
and steel) under the control of a sin
gle common authority, in order to
contribute to economic recovery. This
led to the creation of the European
Coal and Steel Company (ECSC) in
1951 by Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg (the Benelux countries),
as well as (West) Germany, France
and Italy (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002:
17). The aim of the ECSC was to pool
the steel and coal resources of the
member states, in order to prevent
another European war. These were
the states that, through the Treaty of
Rome of 1957, tried to form a European
Defence Community and a French
Political Community but ultimately
succeeded in forming the European
Economic Community (EEC), based
on freedom of movement of goods,
services, capital and people. In 1958
the Benelux Economic Union treaty,
which virtually abolished border checks
within the Benelux area, was signed
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(Zonneveld & D’hondt, 1994: 104). A
series of treaties led to the formation
of the European Union. In 1967 they
became known as the European Com
munities and after signing the Treaty
on European Union in Maastricht 1993
the European Union.
Membership of the European Union is
open to any European country with a
stable democratic government, a
good human rights record, a properly
functioning market economy and
sound micro economic policies (www.
eurunion.org/inmfores/euguide/Chap
ter1.htm). Several enlargements of the
Union occurred over the course of time
as the following countries obtained
membership:
• 1973 United Kingdom, Ireland
and Denmark
• 1981 Greece
• 1986 Spain and Portugal
• 1990 East Germany (which was
reunited with West
Germany, thus increasing
the area and population,
although not the number
of states)
• 1995 Austria, Sweden and
Finland
• 2004 Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland as well as Slovakia
and Slovenia jointly.
The European Union does not have a
formal constitution, but has been built
up on the basis of a series of treaties,
regarded as binding commitments by
the 25 member states that signed
them. Internal agreements between
member states of the European Union,
as well as agreements between mem
ber and non member states, are in
existence, (for example the Schengen
treaty and the Benelux treaty). The
Maastricht treaty, signed in 1992, estab
lished the European Union (EU) as a
‘first pillar’. Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) was designated as a ‘second
pillar’, while Justice and Home Affairs
(JHA) comprised the ‘third pillar’. The
last two pillars are operated through
intergovernmental cooperation.
In 1994 the European Economic Area
was founded in order to enable the
European Free Trade Countries to par
ticipate in a single market, without
having to join the European Market. A
further step towards economic unifi
cation was the agreement that was
entered into by eleven countries in 1999
to abandon their own currencies.  The
circulation of Euro notes and coins sub
sequently commenced in January 2002.
The old European Economic Com
munity was primarily a developed,
urbanised and industrialised economic
block, whose member states were
characterised by a relatively high
standard of living and a good infra
structure. The inclusion of the Eastern
countries into the European Union ex
panded the land area by 25% and
brought in an additional 75 million citi
zens. These new Euro countries are in
need of assistance in the upgrading of
their infrastructure, as well as with re
gard to their average income. A large
proportion of the budget will have to
be spent for this purpose. A positive
aspect, however, is the fact that this
new larger Europe has a market pop
ulation approaching 500 million and a
combined economy approaching that
of the United States of America (The
future of Europe, 2005: online). 
The central point is that, the EU started
off small, as a number of different eco
nomic communities and closely allied
custom unions. Only after working to
gether for 35 years was closer unity
attained in 1992, with the Maastricht
treaty.
4. EUROPEAN PLANNING
The European Community’s regional
policy is the starting point for all
European spatial planning. A spatial
policy (with the exception of transport)
was not the objective of the original
treaty of Rome (Faludi & Waterhout,
2002: 4). Rather, the aim was the es
tablishment of a ‘common market’
where a barrier free space for goods,
persons, services and capital could be
ensured. In order for the European
spatial policy to overcome regional
disparities four structural funds, the
European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF),1 the European Social Fund
(ESF), the European Agricultural Fund
for Guidance (EAFG) and the Financial
Instruments for Fishery Guidance (FIFG)
as well as the cohesion fund were es
tablished. The last is “to be used main
ly for infrastructure investments and
environmental improvements” (Faludi
& Waterhout, 2002: 5). In the period
2000 2006 the EU, according to Faludi
and Waterhout (2002: 5), will spend 213
billion euro as follows, 70% for regions
that are lagging behind economically
and the rest for (a) social and eco
nomic renewal as well as (b) for train
ing and employment.
To understand the development of the
European Spatial Development Per
spective (ESDP), it is necessary to con
sider European planners’ conceptuali
sation of European space in the 1980s
and 1990s. One of the first formulations
of a European Planning Concept was
the ‘Blue Banana,’ developed by
French planners (Zonneveld &
D’Hondt, 1994: 75). In a study con
ducted by Kunzmann and Wagener,
commissioned by the Directorate
General XVI (later D.G. Regio) in 1991,
it was shown that the underlying
image of the ‘Blue Banana’ as a
metaphor for Europe’s competitive
ness should rather be replaced with
the ‘European Bunch of Grapes’,
which Kunzmann and Wagener
regarded as a more cooperative
model, expressing the diversity of
Europe (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002: 11).
Different planning documents, such
as the Europe 2000 (Williams, 1996: 99)
and Europe 2000+, showed clearly
that it was not a ‘European master
plan’ that was needed, but a frame
work or policy to support the
Communities’ spatial planning (Faludi
& Waterhout, 2002: 62). The drafting
of the European Spatial Development
Perspective (ESDP) took more than
ten years to complete. The ESDP was
accepted at the Potsdam meeting in
May 1999 (Goldsmith, 2004: 2). The
aims of the ESDP are to encourage
sustainability and balanced develop
ment across Europe, to remove barriers
to development created by national
boundaries and to support the princi
ple of subsidiary (Goldsmith, 2004: 3).
According to the ESDP (European
Commission, 1999: 19 20), three spatial
development guidelines for the territory
should be followed namely: 
• Development of a polycentric
and balanced urban system
and strengthening of the
partnership between urban
1. A European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF) was established in the early 1970s
in order to lessen regional disparities by
giving fixed sums to member states to
distribute in their regions. The idea was
that in this way, it would be possible for
decisions to be taken at the lowest level.
This is a realistic and feasible approach.
The European Union does not have the
legal authority or competence to under
take land planning. All land use planning
is conducted on the national and sub
national levels (Goldsmith, 2004: 13).
and rural areas. This involves 
overcoming the outdated 
dualism between city and 
countryside. 
• Promotion of integrated 
transport and communica 
lion concepts, which support 
the polycentric development 
of the EU territory and are an 
important pre condition for 
integration into EMU (Euro 
peon Monetary Union). Parity 
of access to infrastructure 
and knowledge should be 
realised gradually. Regionally 
adapted solutions must be 
found for this. 
• Development and conserva 
lion of the natural and the 
cultural heritage through wise 
management. This contributes 
both to the preservation and 
deepening of regional identi 
ties and the maintenance of 
the natural and cultural diver 
sity of the regions and cities of 
the EU in the age of globali 
sation. 
The policies do not apply to the same 
extent to all areas in the EU but should 
respect the distinct cultural. political 
and economical differences of mem 
ber states. The core of Europe, which 
was to be a zone of global economic 
competitiveness, comprised 20 per 
cent of the territory, with 40 per cent 
of the inhabitants and SO per cent of 
the GDP being concentrated in the 
cities of London, Paris, Milan, Munich 
and Hamburg. As the ESDP eschews 
policy maps, no map of this 'pentagon' 
is officially available. However, Faludi 
& Waterhout (2002: 155) are of the 
opinion that Schon's illustration of the 
'20 40 50 pentagon' shows the policy 
in plan form (see fig 1). 
5. AFRICA - A SHORT HISTORY 
The northern portion of Africa has been 
long known to the western world pri 
marily owing to the Egyptian civilisa 
tion that began in about 4000 B.C. 
The Egyptians made contact with the 
black tribes to the south of Egypt and 
influenced the cultural development. 
When the Sahara became drier in the 
third millennium B.C., the part of Africa 
to the south of the Sahara became 
isolated from the northern civilisation. 
According to the Greek historian 
Herodotus, the Phoenicians who were 
sent by Pharaoh Nego in 604 B.C. to 
explore the region to the south, took 
three years to sail from the Red Sea 
around the southern tip of Africa, in 
order to enter Egypt from the Medi 
terranean Sea (Kapp et al., 1992: 24). 
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Waites (1999: 102) describes the situa 
tion in Africa before colonialism as fol 
lows: 
When Europeans began trading 
with Western Africa, there were 
c lear technological disparities 
between the communities they 
encountered and their own: 
Africans did not possess firearms, 
wheeled transport or ocean 
going vessels, and moreover, 
they were not literate. But it 
should not thereby be conclud 
ed that the economic structures 
and technical competences of 
Europe and Africa were radical 
ly different at this time. The lack 
of quantitative data makes it 
impossible to "rank" pre industri 
al societies on the basis of 
objective economic criteria. 
Nevertheless, the descriptive 
evidence suggests that West 
Africa was neither static nor 
particularly 'backward'. 
Nearly 2000 years later, in 1498, the 
Portuguese explorer, Vasco do Gama, 
sailed round the southernmost tip of 
Africa to India and back (Kapp et al., 
1992: 316). For nearly a hundred years, 
the Portuguese dominated the African 
coast. with only a refreshment station 
in Cape Town being founded in 1652 
for the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC). The Portuguese wanted to 
spread Christianity and commerce, 
while the VOC was a 'multi national 
company', only interested in trade, 
and not in colonies in Africa. Colonial 
ism was unable to penetrate into Africa 
in the beginning, owing to parallel 
mountain ranges, strong tribes, and 
tropical illness in Central Africa which 
had a different climate. It wisely es 
tablished mainly on the coastal area 
(except for South Africa). A map show 
ing African colonisation in 1870 con 
firms this (Chamberla in, 1974: 45). At 
the end of the 19th century the 
'scramble for Africa' between Euro 
peon countries was motivated by raw 
materials and markets and was an ex 
Fig 1. Schbn's i lustrotion of "20 40 50 pentagon" 
(SOlxce: Foludi & Woterhout, 2002: 155) 
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ploitative version of European imperial 
ism (Terreblanche. 2005: 7). In 1885 the 
Berlin Treaty - the first of many (Du 
Boahen. 1985: 33 34) - was signed by 
fourteen western countries. The treaty 
contained principles to be followed 
when colonising new areas. By 1914. 
most of Africa had been divided 
between seven countries. 2 namely 
Britain. France. Germany, Portugal. 
Italy, Spain and Belgium (Kapp et al.. 
1984: 228 235).3 
According to Rist (1997: 67) the debate 
as to whether Africa p rofited from 
colonialism is still open. Du Boahen 
(1985: 782 809). in Volume VII of the 
UNESCO General History of Africa. 
found that both positive and negative 
political and social impacts were in 
volved. but that the economic impact 
comprised "a period of ruthless eco 
nomic exploitation rather than eco 
nomic development in Africa". Co 
lonialism lasted less than a hundred 
years for most parts of Africa. Africa 
was a supply region to the so called 
'mother countries' and little industriali 
sation or p rocessing of raw materials 
took p lace. Most infrastructure was 
developed aimed at getting the min 
erals or cash crops to the harbours as 
fast as possible (Du Boahen. 1985: 791). 
No inter African transport or commu 
nication lines were built.4 No wonder 
this gave rise to the dependency par 
adigm in the third world (Fair. 1987: 23). 
The Cold War led by Eisenhower and 
Krushchev led to the decolonisation 
of Africa as well as a very damaging 
'arms race' (Terreblanche. 2005: 7). 
Most African states became inde 
pendent between 19 57 and 1964 but 
were still dependent for capital. imports 
and finance on the old colonial powers 
(Waites. 1999: 290). The boundaries of 
the new African Republics were those 
of the old colonies. These new leaders 
in most cases used the old colonial 
official languages. as they were the 
only lingua franca for the different 
2. A mop of 1914 shows Africa to be totally 
colonised, except 10< Liberia and 
Ethiopia (Chamberlain 1974: 87). 
3. Only Ethiopia and Liberia would remain 
autonomous. Their per capita income in 
2003 were the second and fOlxth lowest 
from 190 wend notions, being respective 
ly $90 and $130. both down $10 from the 
previous year. The EU overage was 
$22850. and the Sub Sahara Africa over 
age was $490 10< 2003. 
4. Most mops showing infrastructure in this 
period tend to show the roiroods going 
d i'ectly to the coast. 
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tribes and peoples. Even today, a large 
proportion of Africa's inhabitants are 
still living in traditional rural areas. 
According to Lee (2003: 29) African 
regionalism was more political than 
economical. as it originated in early 
efforts to liberate the continent from 
colonial and neo colonial rule. The 
Pan Africans vision of collective self 
reliance and introverted strategies was 
based on a controlled economy as well 
as the establishment of sub continental 
economic communities (Soderbaum. 
2004: 69). In Africa south of the Sahara 
these included the South African 
Custums Union (SACU). the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA). the East African Community 
(EAC). the Southern African Develop 
ment Community (SADC). the Eco 
nomic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the Indian 
Ocean Commission (IOC). Except for 
Mozambique most of the SADC mem 
bers belong to more than one organi 
sation (see figure 2). 
The cry for freedom. or Uhuru. was in 
many cases not a 'nationalistic' cry, as 
most of these so called freedom fight 
ers used the language of the oppres 
sor as their lingua franca. In Southern 
Africa. SWAPO and the ANC were 
English speaking movements. while 
those in the neighbouring Angola and 
Mozambique were Portuguese speak 
ing. Most of these movements obtained 
moral and economic support from the 
SADC- Mozambique 
Botswana 
west and military training and support 
from the communist countries. In the 
case of South Africa. the movement 
was spit between a political arm (ANC) 
with headquarters in London and a 
military arm (Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)) 
with headquarters in Russia. However 
Chesterson. ( 1965) in his book The new 
unhappy lords. pointed out that neo 
colonial forces in the form of mining 
companies were in some cases the 
real forces behind the thrones of these 
new leaders. 
In Africa the new leaders of inde 
pendent states wanted to negotiate 
for better economic terms and to be 
more effectively in competition with 
the developed world (Lee. 2003: 29). 
This was discussed in 1958 during an 
ALL AFRICAN People's Conference in 
Accra. Ghana and in subsequent 
African meetings. On 25th May 1963 
the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) 
was created. The organisation for 
African Unity had a rule that "there 
would be no forceful changing of post 
colonial boundaries" (Suzan & Weaver. 
2003: 222). This was a recipe for con 
flict. as old colonies did not take ethnic 
or religious boundaries into considera 
tion at the time of their formation. 
Kebonang (2005: 5) argues that the 
acceptance of these colonial bound 
aries became an important factor in 
justifying one party rule in post colonial 













FiglXe 2. Ovenopping Membership in Regional Economic Organisations 
(SOlXCe: Lee, 2003: 74). 
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In the 1980’s the West adopted neo
liberalism as the paradigm to guide the
world economy (Taylor, 1998: 130). This
was spearheaded by organisations
such as the World Bank, the Inter
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Trade Organisation (WTO). The
fall of communism and the opening
up of the former East Block Countries
had a negative effect on Africa. De
velopment aid was halved between
1989 and 1990 (from US $24.4 billion to
$12.2 billion) while Africa received only
one per cent of global investments
(Olivier 2003: 821). According to the
United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTD) (2004: 2)
the number of least developed coun
tries has increased from 24 in 1971 to 50
in 2004. They accounted in 2002 for
11% of the world’s population and had
an average gross national income per
capita of $438 per year and con
tributed only 0,6% of the world’s GDP.
Africa has 32 of the current 50 least
developed countries, with their per
capita gross national product GDP at
only $297 (UNCTD, 2004: 2, 18).
Internationally two fields of planning
are growing, namely planning for the
environment and planning for the
poor. The United Nations set a target
that 0,7% of the annual GDP of each
economically advanced country
should be allocated for Official Devel
opment Assistance (ODA) (Hancock,
1996: 44). Hancock (1996: 188) found
that ‘aid’ according to the dictionary
is synonym for ‘help’ but in Africa it had
the opposite effect. Africa lost its’ self
sufficiency in food production and
became a continent sized beggar as
its per capita food production has
fallen in every single year since 1962
(Hancock, 1996: 191).
Van Niekerk (1996: 72) describes the
document prepared by African mem
bers for the 1965 World Summit for
Social Development in Denmark as
“analyses of the bad conditions in
Africa”. Their only hope was to show
how bad the situation was in Africa
and to hope that the West would write
off their debts. For sub Saharan coun
tries the total foreign debt rose be
tween 1980 2000 from $60 billion to
$206 billion and the ratio of debt to
the GDP rose from 23% to 66% (Bond,
2003: 2).
6. NEPAD – A NEW PLAN
At the end of the 1990s when the cold
war was something of the past Africa,
issued fresh demands. At the UN con
ference against racism in Durban 2001
Africa’s new demands to the West in
cluded explicit apologies for the slave
trade and colonialism and reparations
such as debt cancellation and health
care funding (McGreal, 2001: 1). On
the other hand the G8 leaders the pre
vious year at Okinawe (Japan)
already required leaders demanded
from the three African president
Bouteflika, Obasanjo and Mbeke that
“a workable plan as a basis of the
compact” must be drawn up
(Adésiná, 2004: 133). Mbeki follow this
up with his vision of an ‘African
Renaissance’ as an intellectual and
cultural project (Oliver, 2003: 79) and
the Millennium African Recovery
Programme (MAP) as the economic
approach (Adésiná, 2004: 133). The
OMEGA Plan of Senegal’s president
Wade was used to focus on regional
infra structure and education (De
Waal, 2002: 466). According to Bond
(2003: 1) the IMF and the World Bank
influenced the formation of the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD).
Olivier (2003: 815) sees Mbeki as the
“seminal thinker behind, and the prin
ciple author and articulator of” NEPAD,
a sentiment with to which Schlemmer
(2004: 78) agrees. Others sees it as a
troika, (presidents Bouteflika, Obasanjo
and Mbeki) who took matters in hand
(Adésiná, 2004: 132; De Waal, 2002:
468) while Amuwo (2002: 7) refers to
the four principle drivers of NEPAD
(South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, and
Algeria). The NEPAD website has under
the section on the origins of NEPAD a
fourth group of founders namely that
a mandate was given to five Heads
of States (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria,
Senegal, South Africa) by the organi
sation of African Unity (NEPAD, 2005:
online).
Unravelling the relationship between
NEPAD and the African Union (AU) is
not that easy as the NEPAD website
does not provide all the answers to the
power politics. De Waal (2002: 463)
comes to the same conclusion. The
following are from the NEPAD WEB site
(NEPAD, 2005: online).
NEPAD is a VISION and STRA
TEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR
AFRICA’S RENEWAL.
The objectives of NEPAD are:
• to eradicate poverty
• to place African countries on
a path of sustainable growth
and development
• to halt marginalisation of
Africa and to integrate it into
the global economy
• to accelerate the empower
ment of woman
That NEPAD is a programme of
the African Union with the fol
lowing structure:
• a steering committee (which
meets once a month) that
oversees projects and pro
gramme development and
reports to
• the Heads of State and
Government Implementation
Committee (HSGIC) which is
responsible to
• the Assembly of the Africa
Union
The official governance structure
could be seen in Figure 3.
De Waal (2002: 46) describes the situ
ation on the following terms: “The
‘enhanced partnership’ presumes to
be a common commitment by African
countries and donors to a set of de
velopment outcomes (defined by
Africa countries)”. The aim is to
achieve an overall annual growth of
7% in order to meet the Millennium De
velopment Goals (MDGs) of halving
poverty by 2015. How exactly NEPAD
will slot in with the structures and pro
cedures of the African Union is to a
certain extend unclear (Schlemmer,
2004: 78; Longwe, 2002: 3; De Waal,
2002: 468). Hokwana described the
situation as follows:
“The AU foresees that NEPAD will
become the economic arm of
the AU and that the AU’s struc
tures will be devised in such a
manner that they complement
NEPAD’s long term objectives.
Thus it is envisaged that the
autonomous NEPAD secretariat
in close co operation with the
economic communities will be
come the main driving force and
implementing agency of the AU’s
economic system (African Cen
tral Bank, African Monetary Fund,
African Economic Union).”
SSB/TRP/MDM 2005(49) 
OAU I AFRICAN UNION {AU) 
SUMMIT OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT 
HEADS OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE 
(Heads of State of 15 Countries) 
(meets once every four months) 
Chairman: Pres. Obasanjo (Nigeria) 
Vice-chairmen: Pres. Bouteflika (Algeria), Pres. Wade (Senegal) 
Central Africa: Cameroon. Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe 
Eastern Africa: Ethiopia. Mauritius. Rwanda 
Northern. Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia 
southern Africa: Botswana. Mozambique. south Africa 
Western Africa: Mali. Nigeria. Senegal 
STEERING COMMITTEE 
(5 Founding Countries) 
(meets once every month) 







(5 people based in Pretoria, South Africa) 
Policy head: Prof. Wiseman NKuhlu 
Three work streams: Project I programme and policy coordination 
Administration and secretarial services 
Communications and Marketing 
FiglXe 3: NEPAD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
(SolXce: Nepod governonce structlXe, (s.o.): online) 
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The African Union consists of 53 mem
ber states out of a possible 58 coun
tries.5 In 1999 the Heads of State and
Government of the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) issued the first of
four declarations which would even
tually lead to the formation of the
African Union (DFA 2005: 2). It is dedi
cated inter alia to promote econom
ic, social and political integration in
Africa, and to a strong commitment
to democracy. It has a political cor
rect vision and a series of objectives
that are worthy of following (DFA,
2005: 2 3). Unfortunately Africa dis
regards its own rules (Schlemmer, 2004:
78). Although 53 members signed the
protocol only 24 agreed to be part of
the peer review process by a panel of
Eminent Persons (Hokwana, 2004: 40)
which is a “voluntary appraisal of
governments’ economic and political
management performance by fellow
Africans” (Kajee, 2005: 1). According to
Amuwo (2002: 11) the peer review will
only be for economic matters while
political matters will be handled by the
institutions of the African Union such as
the parliament or the Commission on
Human Rights. The African Union has
an executive council and a commis
sion with staff to run its operation as
well as the Pan African Parliament
(DFA, 2005: 3). According to Turco
(2003: 370) “the good governance
issue is the pivotal point for the entire
Action Plan”.
The Pan African Parliament is an organ
within the African Union to “ensure the
full participation of African peoples in
governance, development and eco
nomic integration of the continent”
(DFA, 2005: 3). For the first five years it
will only have consultative advisory
powers and all resolutions have to be
confirmed by the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government of the Africa
Union (SABC News, 2004: 1). Each
member state selects five representa
tives from its own parliament. This
immediately leads to the first problem
as Libya has no national assembly
while Uganda is a one party state
(Kajee, 2005).
Once again it is necessary to stress that
the African Unions assembly’s and the
NEPAD summit are both headed by
Heads of State and Government.
7. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
EU AND NEPAD
On the surface the two bodies might
look alike and their objectives and
principles are similar. Both a neo liber
al economic policy which is market
dominated. However, there are signifi
cant differences.
7.1 The effect of Globalisation
In the European Union the drive to
open up markets and remove borders
is driven by a desire to stimulate growth
and development. Even with the add
ition of the new Central European
countries, Europe can be regarded as
a developed region with high levels
of technology and human resource
capacities. It is a region with mostly
good infra structure, good economic
and political governance, an aging
population and negative population
growth. Countries cannot become
members if they do not meet the stand
ards. The per capita GDP for 2003 in
the European Union was $22 580 while
the same figure for Sub Sahara Africa
was $490. The dependency rate in
Africa is much higher with where near
ly 50% of the population is under the
age of 15, compared to that of 20% in
developed countries (Van Niekerk,
2004: 10).
The European Union has profited
through globalisation and it has long
been industrialised and exports high
value goods to the rest of the world.
Africa, on the other hand, has to ex
port raw materials at prices that con
stantly going down. Between 1975 and
1980 the price per ton of copper went
down from $17 800 to $9 500, that of
cocoa from $23 400 to $10 200 and
coffee from $22 800 to $13 300 (Hok
wane, 2004: 56). Africa’s share of world
export went down from 8 per cent
some fifty years ago to just 2 per cent,
leaving millions of Africans and their
families worse off than in the 1960’s
(Olivier, 2002: 826).
South Africa constitutes 29 per cent of
all Africa’s GPD and the equivalent of
85 per cent of Sub Saharan GPD if
South Africa is excluded (Thomas &
Coetzee, 2004: 17). Between 1994 and
1999, South African companies invested
$1.6 billion more than inflows into the
country (Carmody, 2002: 264). South
African’s only large trans national
companies which appeared on the
Fortune 500 listing namely (Anglo
American Corporation, Liberty Life,
S.A.Breweries and Old Mutual) secured
primary listing on the London Stock Ex
change (Lesufi, 2004: 818).
In Europe no single country dominates
but in Africa South Africa is in an eco
nomic dominating position. During the
period 1996 1998 South Africa’s total
investment in the Southern African
Development Community has in
creased from 11 per cent to 40 per
cent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
(Millar, 2004: 14). According to Lefusi,
(2004: 822) South Africa capital takes
the soft options where “the bulk of new
activity in Africa has been through
mergers, take overs and joint ventures.”
Globalisation has had a very negative
impact on the economy of Africa as
playing fields are not equal. African
countries need access to the markets
of the developed world but the latter
are protected by barriers particularly
in agriculture. Accordingly to Owusu
(2003:1688) the European Union, the
United States and Japan spend one
billion Dollar a day to protect their
farmers. 
7.2 The effects of Fragmentation
The structure of the European Union
makes it possible for smaller ethnic
groups, which are located in more
than one country to have a voice and
work together in a European Parlia
ment. The African Union and its struc
tures are not directly elected, for and
of the 53 members which states are
represented, only ten held free and
democratic elections between 1990
and 1998 (Hokwane, 2004: 91 92). No
civil society input was sought by the
politicians and technocrats construct
ing NEPAD (Bond, 2002: 2). 
The old colonial boundaries did not
take the numerous ethnic groupings
into consideration. This has led to nu
merous civil wars, military coup d’etats
and authoritarian states (Hokwane,
2004: 50 51). As an example, Tanzania
alone has more than 150 ethnic com
munities or tribes (Terreblanche, 2005:
5). 
The only place where this fragmenta
tion and diversity is dealt with is in the
Constitutive Act of the AU; in Article
3(b), it states that the AU will defend
the sovereignty of its member states;
in Article 4(g) that it shall not intervene
into the affairs of other states and in
Article 4(h) where it is stated that it
shall intervene in cases of human rights
abuses (Hokwane, 2004: 79). 5. Some sources refer to 54 and others to




In the European Union, relatively sound
governance is a given since a country
can not become a member if it do not
comply with the standards set for a
democracy. Africa has a history of
poor governance and NEPAD’s recog
nition that it has to be addressed is
noteworthy. Three dimensions of gov
ernance are particularly emphasized:
economic and corporative; political;
and peace and security (De Waal,
2002: 471). The African Peer Review
mechanism holds the potential to help
Africa solve its problems (Hokwane,
2004: 39). Bond (2003: 2) argues it is a
naive hope that governance will result
from the document while nothing is
done to curb election abuses in Nigeria
and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, only 24
of the 53 members have signed the
peer review agreement: it is possible
to become a member of the African
Union and be represented in the Pan
African Parliament without agreeing
to those peer reviews. This Peer Review
mechanism might also be the Achilles
heel of the African Union. The conduct
of NEPAD in this regard could influence
its future credibility. 
In terms of economic governance,
Terreblanche (2005: 15) states that
“roughly 80 cents of every dollar was
borrowed by African countries flowed
back as capital flight in the same year”
and that it is “estimated that Africas
ruling elite have private assets equiva
lent to 145% of the public debt these
countries owed”. Klitgaard (1994: 492)
in and article entitled “Bribes, tribes
and markets that fail” comes to the
conclusion that “you can have both
growth and redistribution, both effi
ciency and justice, by making govern
ment freer from corruption, reducing
institutionalised discrimination that is
born of ignorance and imperfect in
formation, and improving the many
markets that impinge upon the poor”.
Schlemmer (2004: 86 87) also refers to
Africa, and specifically South Africa’s
handling of the HIV/AIDS issue as well
as the promise of delivery and a bet
ter life for all that it will backfire if it
never becomes a reality. After 50 years
of self governance, the economic situ
ation in Africa has deteriorated and
NEPAD will have to prove that ‘under
development’ is not per se associated
with corruption, ethnic discrimination
and exploitation.
7.4 Planning Constraints
The scale of the African continent and
its diversity is huge. It extends from its
most southern tip to the north, over
8000 km and from east to west nearly
7500 km wide. 
7.4.1 Physical barriers to planning
The biggest obstacle dividing Africa is
the Sahara dessert stretching across
Africa from east to west and is approxi
mately 1000km from north to south.
Very few people are located on the
adjacent low rainfall areas. 
A further physical obstacle is the Zaire
delta, with the tropical swamp forest
and associated network of rivers and
floodplains. To cross it would be ex
pensive and maintenance cost of
movement infrastructure would be
very high.
Africa has some trans national infra
structure that was erected in colonial
times with the building of railroads.
These were mostly build between 1890
and 1950. Good roads and other forms
of infrastructure are however scarce
and without good and reliable infra
structure there can be little trade.
“Africa’s roads and railway lines,
ports and power grids are neither
adequate nor reliable. Outside
of Southern Africa and Mauritius,
much of the continent’s infra
structure is crumbling or nonex
istent. Consider the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. You
could fit France, Germany, Italy,
Norway, Spain and Britain inside
it, and the country is packed
with timber and minerals, yet it
has only a few thousand kilome
tres of paved road and 10,000
fixed telephone lines, and pro
duces about the same amount
of power as Albania. In other
war torn countries, such as
Somalia and Sierra Leone, pub
lic buildings have been de
stroyed by years of fighting.
Corruption and mismanage
ment have left public utilities in
places such as Cameron and
Nigeria run down and ineffi
cient” (Robinson, 2005: 24).
The idea of trans African highways
consisting of 9 corridors with a total
length of 59100km was formulated in
the early 1970’s (SWECO, 2003: 7).
Raising the finances to build these
roads might be the easier part of these
projects. The cost of maintenance and
of the bureaucracy administration
thereof might be far more costly.
People sometimes wait seven hours at
a border post between South Africa
and Zimbabwe past corrupt traffic
cops and other officials. The World
Bank estimates that the transport for a
container from Baltimore in the United
States of America to Tanzania cost
about $1000, but from Tanzania to the
neighbouring Burundi it might cost as
high as $10 000 (Robinson, 2005: 24).
7.4.2 Language barriers 
Over 750 languages are spoken on the
continent. Language differences give
rise to ethnic differences and in Africa
where tribal discrimination has been
practice, it may give rise to civil wars
and struggles for freedom. Wars also
contribute to famine and to destruc
tion of infrastructure. In several states,
minority tribes have seized power and
rule as dictators. An example is the
government of Kabila in the Demo
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
who, with his Tutsi tribe, control most
official state positions, although they
constitute only one million of the total
population of 43 million. 
The recent no votes in France and the
Netherlands in referendums on a new
constitution for the European Union
show that countries and people do not
easily give up their sovereignty. The
European Union in its structure leave
tolerance for a Europe of regions as
the Basque – people in both France
and Spain could get representatives
in the European Union and could there
work together. But the future of these
small nations is not secure even in
Europe. Western Europe is presently
experiencing a rise in the use of English,
largely around the globalisation of the
academic world. Every University wants
to be an international player, thus
graduate courses are offered in English.
This helps you to keep numbers of stu
dents high. The drop in birth rates over
the last 20 years has meant that uni
versities either have to globalize or
reduce size.
7.4.3 Religious barriers
Along the southern edges of the
Sahara, where the Muslims and non
Muslims meet, there is conflict. Some
of the governments in North Africa,
like Egypt, are opposed by Islamic
Fundamentalists and this leads to
political friction and conflict. 
Religion can also be used to political
ends as a tool to obtain foreign help.
In 1977 for example Bokassa from New
Guinea declared him an emperor and
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spent 20 million dollar, given to him by
the French, on the crowning ceremo
ny. Afterwards he was twice convert
ed to Islam to obtain money from
people like Mohammed Gaddafi, only
to be reconverted to Christianity (Van
Niekerk, 1996: 93). The fact that the
country was anti  communist at that
stage helped the west to ignore what
happened in that state.
In South Africa there is the conflict be
tween the traditionalists and the mod
ernists. This is not simply a matter of
politics or democracy. The traditional
leaders were ‘elected’ by the ances
tors and chiefs and king are thus tribe
leaders but in a sense religious leaders
as well. Control over tribal land, which
is the power base of the chiefs, is a
cause of conflict. The democratic
elected government wants to do away
with tribal land and tribal control over
it. In customary law, land is not an eco
nomical commodity which can be
bought and sold. It is a resource that
belongs to the spirits of the ancestors
as well as to generations yet to come.
No one person can ever possess it: the
western world of economic thinking
does not fit into this paradigm.
8. CONCLUSION
It is widely argued that NEPAD should
follow the path of the European Union.
This paper shows there are substantial
contextual and other differences.
The European Union grow from a series
of small economic unions into a larger
body while the African Union started
as a politically driven union with the
aim to attract foreign investments and
to eradicate poverty through high
economic growth. It still has to prove
that it can be economically sustain
able in a global economic market.
Africa will have to develop its own
model and will have to make it work.
The focus must be to develop one
Regional Economic Organisation for
each of the five sub regions of Africa,
(Southern Africa, Central Africa, East
Africa, West Africa, North Africa) and
get them to work in terms of the NEPAD
vision. No overlapping memberships
of member states should be allowed. 
In the Southern Africa Development
Community, South Africa plays
according to Geyer (2003: 409) an
important role as a gateway to Africa
and as a role model of implementing
global economic politics. The South
African positive influence is under
mined by the tactic of ‘silent diploma
cy’ towards the abuses of power by
the Zimbabwean government (Miller,
2005: 55). It will have to use its position
as a regional power in the peer review
process as a disciplining instrument
and not only for rhetoric. When the
different economic regions of Africa
are succeeding in getting their sub
regions on the path of sustainable
growth, development and good gov
ernance they can start investigating
the viability of the bigger economic
union. 
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